https://www.geneva-academy.ch/news/detail/764-new-publication-examines-t...
Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) have long operated on the edges of conflict, providing everything from combat support to site protection and logistical services. However, a small subset — which this research calls the '1%' — has evolved into something more complex on the border of private enterprise, state-backed militias, and mercenaries.
Our latest research brief, The 1%: Doing Business With Proxy Military Companies, authored by Associate Researcher Robin van der Lugt, examines how these entities — termed 'proxy military companies' — have reshaped warfare, international law, and global stability. Unlike conventional PMSCs, these groups are not independent security contractors operating in competitive markets. Instead, they function as extensions of state power, conducting combat operations, hybrid warfare, and resource exploitation on behalf of authoritarian regimes.
The report highlights key actors in this space, including Russia’s now-rebranded Wagner Group, Türkiye’s SADAT, and UAE-backed combat surrogates. These entities operate with near-total impunity, exploiting legal loopholes and plausible deniability to evade accountability. The report asserts that their emergence represents more than just an evolution of private military forces; it signals a return to Cold War-style proxy warfare, where states outsource violence while avoiding direct responsibility.
One risk, explains Erica Harper, Head of Research and Policy Studies at the Geneva Academy, is a lowering of the entry barriers to conflict. 'Part of the attractiveness of PMCs is that they can break rules that States can’t or shouldn’t. A rule free zone that is beyond the reach of international accountability interrupts the system’s ability to uphold peace and security. Left too long, this may spill over into a new normal around inter-State conduct at a time when the system lacks the robustness to self correct.'
Robin van der Lugt explains, 'Existing regulatory frameworks, such as the Montreux Document and the International Code of Conduct (ICoC), were designed to bring oversight to PMSCs operating in commercial markets. However, these guidelines fail to address state-sponsored entities whose actions are driven by geopolitical strategy rather than market forces. The result is a system ill-equipped to regulate modern PMSCs that act as covert arms of state policy rather than independent contractors.'
The paper argues for a critical reclassification of these entities, explaining that terms such as 'private military company' fail to capture their true nature, obscuring their direct ties to state interests. Instead, recognizing them as proxy military companies or contractual proxies more accurately reflects their role in contemporary conflicts and underscores the urgent need for new accountability mechanisms.
