Defending Democracy in Exile (Freedom House)

WHAT IS TRANSNATIONAL REPRESSION?

Full Report here: https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2022-05/Complete_Transnatio...

https://freedomhouse.org/report/transnational-repression

It is governments reaching across borders to silence dissent among diasporas and exiles, including through assassinations, illegal deportations, abductions, digital threats, Interpol abuse, and family intimidation.

It is a daily assault on civilians everywhere — including in democracies like the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, Australia, and South Africa.

Critical voices that challenge authoritarian rule become voices to silence. Journalists and human rights defenders. Diaspora groups and family members of exiles. Political activists, dissidents and civil society leaders.

What appear to be isolated incidents when viewed separately—an assassination here, a kidnapping there—in fact form a constant threat across the world that is affecting the lives of millions of people and changing how activists, journalists, and regular individuals go about their lives. Transnational repression is no longer an exceptional tool, but a normal and institutionalized practice for dozens of countries that seek to control their citizens abroad.

Its impact on the rights of victims is severe. Even those who are not directly targeted may decide based on the threat against their community to remain silent. This is true of the most extreme violence: a single killing or rendition sends ripples throughout a huge circle of people. But even digital threats or family intimidation—the easiest and most common forms of transnational repression—create an atmosphere of fear among exiles that pervades everyday activities.

The recommendations listed below are intended to constrain the ability of states to commit acts of transnational repression, to increase accountability for perpetrators of transnational repression, and to provide protection for at-risk exiles and diasporas.

Reducing opportunities for authoritarian states to manipulate institutions within democracies will make it harder for them to target exiles and diasporas. Consistent accountability will moreover raise the cost of transnational repression for perpetrators.

Jump to Recommendations for:

• The United States
• Governments of Countries That Host Exiles, Targeted Diaspora
• Civil Society
• UN Member States
• Technology Companies
• Host Countries: Germany | South Africa | Sweden | Turkey | Thailand | Ukraine | United Kingdom | Canada

Recommendations for improving the United States' response to transnational repression at home and abroad

Raising awareness about the threat of transnational repression

Ensure that law enforcement officials, personnel at key agencies, and those working with refugees are trained to recognize transnational repression. Law enforcement officials and agency personnel can play a central role in protecting exiles who are targeted. For example, timely diplomatic intervention, whether public or private, in isolation or in coordination with other states, can be the difference between an unlawful deportation and freedom for a targeted individual. Personnel at key agencies should receive training to help them identify potential perpetrators and victims of transnational repression, and on the relevant laws that can be invoked to combat transnational repression and mitigate harm. These key agencies include the Department of State; the Department of Homeland Security (DHS),including US Customs and Border Protection (CBP), US Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), and US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE); the Department of Justice, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); other federal, state, and local law enforcement officials receiving instruction at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, and business and community leaders completing the Citizens Academy; and employees of the Department of Health and Human Service’s Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR). Training programs should be ongoing, taking place periodically across levels of seniority.

Ensure comprehensive reporting on transnational repression in State Department’s Human Rights Reports. Since 2019, US State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices have included a section on “politically motivated reprisals against individuals located outside the country.” This section should be strengthened and made consistent across all country reports to help create a more robust record of transnational repression, encourage greater awareness of the phenomenon, and help officials better respond to the problem. A provision included in the FY23 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) requires the Departments of Justice and State to produce biannually a report detailing, among other things, “a list of countries that the Attorney General and the Secretary determine have repeatedly abused and misused the Red Notice and diffusion mechanisms for political purposes.” The countries highlighted in this joint report and the details about their misuse of Interpol should be included in the relevant State Department Human Rights Reports.

Issue travel advisories about countries engaging in transnational repression. Potential targets of transnational repression are at particular risk when traveling abroad, and US citizens and residents have been targeted while outside of the United States. The US Department of State provides travel advisories regarding issues abroad that may impact the safety and security of American travelers. This information, which typically includes details about terrorist and security threats, crime, civil unrest, and health and environmental risks, is intended to help US citizens make informed decisions about whether or not to travel abroad. Advisories should be issued about countries whose governments engage in transnational repression or where acts of transnational repression frequently occur.

Establish standardized outreach procedures for vulnerable communities. In August 2021, the FBI began to issue unclassified counterintelligence bulletins describing the risks faced by Uyghurs and other diaspora groups from transnational repression. The bulletins contained information on specific incidents and directed individuals to contact the FBI if they had experienced targeting. In February 2022, the FBI launched a website devoted to transnational repression with information on tactics, hyperlinks to recent indictments, and contact information for reporting. The FBI should continue producing resources for vulnerable groups and publishing them in relevant languages. State and local law enforcement should conduct similar outreach as appropriate, and federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies should continue working jointly to investigate leads on suspected transnational repression in the United States. Many victims of transnational repression come from countries where law enforcement officials are involved in perpetrating abuses on behalf of the state, contributing to potential distrust of US law enforcement agents. Building trust with targeted communities is critical to addressing transnational repression threats before they escalate. Communities that understand how law enforcement can protect them, and that outreach to law enforcement will not result in negative consequences, are more resilient to foreign coercion and surveillance. To supplement these informational efforts, law enforcement should provide guidance to vulnerable communities on how to document evidence of harassment, intimidation, or stalking to help mitigate obstacles to reporting and prosecution. Law enforcement should consult with stakeholders including civil society and technology companies to develop and publicize this guidance. Other agencies, especially those working with migrants and refugees, should develop similar outreach strategies.
 

Congress should pass the bipartisan Foreign Advanced Technology Surveillance Accountability Act (H.R.2075) to better understand which governments use surveillance to target victims of transnational repression. This bill would require the Department of State to include information in its annual Human Rights Reports about the extent to which governments are using excessive surveillance or advanced technologies to violate rights. The report should also include information on which companies or countries have provided biometric or facial-recognition data to states using these technologies to violate rights. A more detailed understanding of which countries use surveillance to target critics can assist development of safeguards for potential victims of transnational repression, and of targeted sanctions for perpetrators.

Work with the Department of Justice and other relevant agencies to update transparency laws regarding individuals acting on behalf of foreign governments. A critical step in curbing transnational repression is recognizing the specific actors committing transnational abuses on behalf of their home governments. In the United States, antiquated procedures for regulation of foreign agents under the Foreign Agent Registrations Act of 1938 (22 U.S.C. 611 et seq) and 18 U.S.C. Section 951 are a major obstacle to identifying those acting on behalf of repressive regimes. Although the Department of Justice has ramped up enforcement against alleged perpetrators of transnational repression, the laws remain outdated and do not address the realities of modern-day foreign influence activities. The absence of effective regulation in this area makes it harder than it should be to distinguish legal activity on behalf of a foreign power or entity from illegal activity, and thus to address transnational repression threats before they escalate. Congress should closely consult civil society groups to mitigate unintended consequences in any update, such as US-based organizations being required to register as foreign agents simply because they receive portions of their funding from non-US sources.

Work at international organizations and bodies with like-minded governments to highlight the threat of transnational repression and establish international norms for addressing it. The United States should work with partners and allies to call for the creation of a special rapporteur for transnational repression at the United Nations. The United States should use its voice, vote, and influence to introduce resolutions at bodies to which it belongs condemning the use of transnational repression and calling on governments to bring accountability for abuses and protection for victims.

Limiting the ability of perpetrators to commit transnational repression

Congress should codify a definition of transnational repression, and work with the executive branch and civil society to ensure laws offer protection against all of its varieties. Many types of transnational repression fall outside the scope of activities covered by existing law. This can make it more difficult for law enforcement agents to assist victims and apprehend and prosecute perpetrators. Codification of a definition of transnational repression is a needed first step toward determining which new authorities may be needed. A possible definition could include the following: “The term transnational repression describes the ways a government reaches across national borders to intimidate, silence, or harm an exile, refugee, or member of diaspora who they perceive as a threat and have a political incentive to control. Methods of transnational repression include assassinations, physical assaults, detention, rendition, unlawful deportation, unexplained or enforced disappearance, physical surveillance or stalking, passport cancellation or control over other documents, Interpol abuse, digital threats, spyware, cyberattacks, social media surveillance, online harassment, and harassment of or harm to family and associates who remain in the country of origin.” Close attention should be given to the protection of civil liberties as new laws are considered.

Examine the domestic utility of and international experience with laws criminalizing “individual espionage.” Spying on refugees, a common tactic of transnational repression, is not directly criminalized in the United States. In a number of Nordic and Western European countries, spying on individuals is either explicitly criminalized as “refugee espionage,” or clearly incorporated into general espionage provisions. In the United States, however, espionage is narrowly defined as the collection or distribution of sensitive defense information. A new statute addressing “individual espionage” or similar activities might help law enforcement address transnational repression. Study of this issue should include any possible negative spillover effects for refugees and migrants themselves.

Create a screening process for diplomatic visas to prevent the entry or accreditation of diplomatic personnel with a history of harassing, intimidating, or harming their diasporas. Doing so could prevent transnational repression before it occurs. If diplomatic personnel already within the United States are found to be engaging in transnational repression, they should be designated personae non gratae and expelled, or held accountable under law when appropriate.

Give extra scrutiny to export licensing applications from companies exporting products to countries whose governments engage in human rights abuses, especially those previously identified as perpetrators of transnational repression. The United States, Australia, Denmark, and Norway, supported by Canada, France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, recently announced the Export Controls and Human Rights Initiative, intended to “help stem the tide of authoritarian government misuse of technology and promote a positive vision for technologies anchored by democratic values.” The United States also recently updated its licensing policy to restrict the export of items if there is “a risk that the items will be used to violate or abuse human rights.” When implementing these new initiatives and policies, the United States should consult research by Freedom House and other human rights organizations to determine whether there is a risk that the exported items could enable human rights abuses. Extra scrutiny should be given to the export of items that could enable transnational repression, especially if those items are intended for countries whose governments have been identified as perpetrators of transnational repression.

Apply the voice, vote, and influence of the US government to limit the ability of Interpol member countries to target critics through misuse of Red Notices and other alerts. Interpol’s executive leadership includes representatives of governments notorious for perpetrating human rights abuses, including transnational repression. In November 2021, Ahmed Naser al-Raisi of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) was elected president of Interpol; he is the subject of lawsuits filed in the United Kingdom, Sweden, Norway, France, and Turkey accusing him of complicity in torture inside UAE’s prisons. The UAE has also cooperated with other countries engaging in transnational repression and has engaged in transnational repression of its own. In that same election, Hu Binchen, deputy director general of the Chinese public security ministry, was elected to Interpol’s executive committee. The government of China conducts the most sophisticated, global, and comprehensive campaign of transnational repression in the world. Al-Raisi and Hu join senior Interpol officials from Turkey and India, whose governments have also engaged in transnational repression. The United States is by far the largest statutory contributor to Interpol’s budget, and should leverage its contributions alongside other democracies to improve the functioning of Interpol, reduce opportunities for abuse, and support the candidacy of individuals for leadership positions who will enforce Interpol’s commitment to human rights.

Prohibit the use of Interpol notices on their own to deny immigration or asylum benefits or conduct arrests. At present, ICE can and does use Interpol notices as proof of an immigration offence to invalidate an individual’s legal visa and to challenge a claim for asylum. Though it is unclear how frequently this occurs each year, this practice leads to detention and the risk of deportation. To ensure perpetrators are not able to mislead agents of the US government into aiding and abetting acts of transnational repression, law should require that notices issued by countries with which the US does not have an extradition agreement be independently verified before they are applied against individuals in the US on lawful visas or making a claim for asylum. Current Department of Justice policy prohibits the arrest of an individual solely on the basis of an Interpol Red Notice because these notices do not meet the probable cause standard of the Constitution. This policy should be codified.

The Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Inspector General should investigate the extent to which Interpol notices are used to invalidates visas or as probable cause to believe that a person applying for asylum has committed a serious nonpolitical crime. The report should include detailed information on the number of incidents where ICE or DHS use Interpol notices as evidence against a noncitizen in the United States, the countries that issued the notices that were used, the claims included in those notices, whether any of the cases would count as transnational repression, and detailed recommendations for ensuring that US immigration officials and judges are not unwittingly complicit in acts of transnational repression.

Bringing accountability for acts of transnational repression

Deploy a robust strategy for targeted sanctions against perpetrators of transnational repression. Targeted sanctions, such as denying or revoking visas for entry to the United States, or freezing US-based assets, enjoy broad bipartisan support and should play a key role in raising the cost of transnational repression for perpetrators. To make sanctions as impactful as possible:

• Impose the strongest possible targeted sanctions on perpetrators and enablers of acts of transnational repression. Current law and presidential actions allow for targeted sanctions on individuals (including both government officials and private citizens) and entities involved in human rights abuses, including assassinations and renditions, which are some of the most serious forms of transnational repression. In some cases, the family members of perpetrators are also eligible for sanction.
• Impose export controls on companies that knowingly provided technologies, goods, or services to facilitate the commission of transnational repression. Policymakers should investigate the extent to which commercial surveillance tools, such as spyware and extraction technology, have been used against Americans and in the commission of transnational repression.
• Congress should pass the Revealing and Explaining Exclusions for Accountability (REVEAL) Act (S.2392/H.R.4557). Section 212(a)(3)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) allows the US government to deny entry to a person if there is “reasonable ground to believe [that person’s entry to the United States] would have potentially serious adverse foreign policy consequences.” But, under current law the names of those denied entry and reasons for their denial may not be made public. The REVEAL Act would allow names and reasons for visa denial to be made public—a naming and shaming tactic that could help deter future abuses.
• Congress and the executive branch should work together to ensure robust funding for the implementation and enforcement of targeted sanctions. The US Department of the Treasury, Department of State, and Department of Justice all collect information about suspected perpetrators of abuses eligible for sanction. Unfortunately, the number of potential sanctions cases to be vetted by the US government far exceeds current capacity, and the recent flurry of sanctions related to the Kremlin’s invasion of Ukraine has added to this workload. Funding for additional personnel in relevant sanctions offices would help ensure the executive branch has adequate capacity to implement sanctions policies.

Restrict security assistance for states engaging in transnational repression. Section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (22 USC 2304), is intended to “promote and encourage respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms throughout the world” by making the observance of human rights a “principal goal of US foreign policy.” Current law prohibits the provision of security assistance to any government engaging “in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights” unless the president certifies to Congress that “extraordinary circumstances” warrant the provision of assistance. This section should be updated to allow the restriction of security assistance for states consistently engaging in acts of transnational repression. This would serve the dual purpose of limiting an aggressor government’s resources for engaging in transnational repression while also sending a strong signal that the behavior is unacceptable.

Supporting victims of transnational repression

Ensure the United States maintains a robust refugee resettlement program and an efficient, rights-based approach to assessing claims for asylum to protect victims of transnational repression and others fleeing persecution. As Congress noted in the Refugee Resettlement Act of 1980, “it is the historic policy of the United States to respond to the urgent needs of persons subject to persecution in their homelands.” Many refugees fled political persecution in countries that engage in transnational repression, and face threats even after resettlement. Refugees who live in strong democracies where the rule of law is upheld and institutions are accountable have stronger basic protection against transnational repression than those who do not. With this in mind, the Biden administration should:

• Commit to rebuilding the country’s refugee resettlement program and provide adequate resources to eliminate the asylum processing backlog. Each year, the president and Congress work together to set an annual cap on the number of allowable refugee resettlement admissions for that year. Historically, the cap has been as high as 207,116 in 1980, and as low as 15,000 in 2021. The Biden administration should work with Congress to uphold the United States’ commitment to refugee resettlement and ensure that victims of transnational repression have the chance to enter the United States as refugees. Victims of transnational repression who are already in the United States and seeking asylum face a years-long wait due to a claims processing backlog, and are especially vulnerable while their legal status remains in limbo. Asylum seekers cannot reunite with their families abroad, face delays securing eligibility for employment, are unable to pursue educational opportunities, and face the threat of deportation. As of the end of the fiscal year 2021, USCIS had 412,796 pending applications for asylum.
• Provide protections to specific populations that experience persecution and targeting for transnational repression as a group. Uyghurs are one such group. For Uyghurs inside the United States, resources should be invested into processing their expedited requests for affirmative asylum. Uyghurs located outside the United States should be recognized as persons of special humanitarian concern who are eligible for Priority 2 (P-2) processing under the refugee resettlement priority system administered by the United States Refugee Admissions Program. The Uyghur Human Rights Protection Act (S.1080/H.R.1630), which is included in the America COMPETES Act (H.R.4521), would provide Uyghurs access to P-2 processing and should be passed. The administration and Congress should work with civil society to identify other populations facing transnational repression as a group, and offer them similar protections.

Recommendations for governments of countries that host exiles, targeted diasporas

Improve education and raise awareness about the threat of transnational repression

• Establish an official definition of transnational repression to be used by all government agencies. This definition should recognize that transnational repression is a threat to democratic institutions and the exercise of individual rights.
• Develop a plan to spread awareness among law enforcement agencies, intelligence services, and officials working with refugees and asylum seekers so that they can incorporate the definition of transnational repression into their procedures, recognize potential perpetrators and victims, and better mitigate and respond to threats.
• Issue travel advisories about states that engage in transnational repression, enabling citizens and residents to make informed decisions about whether and where to travel abroad.
• Develop specific outreach strategies to connect law enforcement agencies with targeted diaspora communities. Inform individuals who are vulnerable to transnational repression of the resources available to them, and learn about different communities’ concerns. Engagement should treat individuals targeted by transnational repression as victims to be protected, not as potential security threats. This outreach should be separate from efforts to counter violent extremism. Although both activities require building community trust, the source and intent of the threat in these two policy areas is quite different. Whenever possible, authorities should distinguish between surveillance and coercion by foreign state agents on the one hand, and indoctrination and recruitment by violent extremist groups on the other.

Track transnational repression and coordinate responses

• Establish a specific mechanism to track domestic incidents of transnational repression and identify the perpetrator governments. The governments of host countries must create processes to recognize and record cases that occur within their borders. These processes can be built into the existing crime-reporting systems used by law enforcement agencies, but they may require specialized training about the tactics of transnational repression.
• Review counterintelligence and law enforcement information-sharing practices and ensure that they effectively disseminate data about threats stemming from transnational repression. Information needs to be properly circulated among agencies responsible for domestic intelligence and law enforcement at all levels of government in order to ensure that vulnerable individuals receive adequate warning and protection.

Limit the ability of perpetrators to commit transnational repression

• Apply additional vetting to extradition requests and Interpol notices from the governments of countries rated Not Free by Freedom House—and particularly those known to engage in transnational repression—to prevent abuse of law enforcement and judicial processes.
• Review extradition, legal cooperation, readmission and return, and intelligence-sharing agreements with governments that engage in transnational repression. Identify agreements and processes that need additional oversight or that should be discontinued altogether to prevent abuse.
• Screen applications for diplomatic visas to avoid granting accreditation to diplomatic personnel who have harassed, intimidated, or otherwise harmed exiles or diaspora members in the past.
• Restrict the export of surveillance technology. When reviewing export licensing applications, give extra scrutiny to applications from companies seeking to export products to countries whose governments may engage in human rights abuses, especially those previously identified as perpetrators of transnational repression. Where export controls already exist, governments should enforce them thoroughly and update and strengthen them as necessary to account for the development of new technologies.
• Strictly regulate the purchase and use of surveillance tools and protect end-to-end encryption. Government surveillance programs should adhere to the International Principles on the Application of Human Rights to Communications Surveillance, a framework agreed upon by a broad consortium of civil society groups, industry leaders, and scholars with the aim of protecting users’ rights. The principles, which state that all communications surveillance must be legal, necessary, and proportionate, should also be applied to open-source intelligence methods such as social media monitoring and the use of intrusive tools such as spyware. To protect the digital security of people targeted by transnational repression, governments should refrain from introducing legislation that weakens encryption, for example by mandating “backdoor” access for authorities or the ability to trace messages.

Deliver accountability for acts of transnational repression

• Impose targeted sanctions on perpetrators and enablers of transnational repression. Legislation like the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act in the United States provides a mechanism for imposing travel bans and asset freezes on perpetrators of serious human rights abuses. Issuing sanctions for acts of transnational repression in particular would send a strong signal that perpetrators will be held accountable. Countries that possess Magnitsky-style laws should fully enforce them, and countries that lack such legal authorities should enact them. Whenever possible, governments should apply sanctions in a coordinated, multilateral manner for maximum impact.
• Use persona non grata designations to ensure accountability for transnational repression. Expel diplomats who are directly involved in transnational repression, or whose governments have committed specific incidents of transnational repression in the host country. Publicly and specifically link the persona non grata designations to individual instances of transnational repression.
• Restrict security assistance and arms sales to governments that perpetrate acts of transnational repression. Such governments cannot be trusted to use such assistance responsibly, and they should not be rewarded for violating individual rights and national sovereignty beyond their borders.

Support victims of transnational repression

• Review the processes for issuing warnings and assigning police protection to individuals, and ensure that they account for the threat of transnational repression.
• Commit to respecting the right to seek asylum. Migration systems should follow the principles set out in the 1951 Refugee Convention. Countries should not create policies with the aim of preventing asylum seekers from accessing their territory. Nor should governments shift the responsibility for asylee processing to third states where people are more vulnerable to transnational repression.
• Strengthen existing refugee resettlement programs by including resources to address the threat of transnational repression faced by some newcomers. 
• Limit the use of temporary and subsidiary forms of protection for asylum seekers and instead grant full refugee status. Such status offers a better safeguard against transnational repression by making the protection permanent, reducing reliance on the origin country for documents, and allowing for family reunification, which reduces the threat of coercion by proxy.
• Recognize that certain populations experience persecution as a group. Official recognition would eliminate the obligation to prove individualized persecution in asylum cases.
• Include details on the use of transnational repression in the information about countries of origin that is consulted during reviews of asylum applications. Such information would raise awareness among migration officials and help to thwart improper extradition or repatriation requests made by repressive governments.
• Build resilience against the use of spurious terrorism charges to distort host countries’ asylum and extradition processes. Fifty-three percent of cases of physical transnational repression involve accusations of terrorism, which allow origin states to exploit the security concerns of host states and persuade them to unjustly detain and deport targeted individuals. These accusations often tap into existing xenophobic and Islamophobic biases in host countries. Governments should review migration practices to identify areas where policies focused on combating violent extremism and terrorism effectively view people as potential security threats rather than potential victims and thus overlook the risk of complicity in transnational repression.

Fund civil society organizations that monitor incidents of transnational repression or that provide resources to targeted individuals and groups. Ensure that civil society work on both digital and physical forms of transnational repression receives adequate and sustainable financing.

Recommendations for civil society

• Invest in digital hygiene trainings and make resources on digital security widely accessible to targeted communities, reaching beyond professional activists and journalists. Where the community includes refugees, digital hygiene should be integrated into refugee resettlement programs. Digital hygiene training should include incident response planning, which allows people to prepare for the steps they should take if they suspect that their digital security has been compromised.
• Continue to document incidents of transnational repression, analyze perpetrator states’ tactics, and identify gaps in policy responses. Civil society groups often have unique, on-the-ground sources of information and are a key point of contact for affected individuals. By sharing their data and analysis with the media and policymakers, they can improve public awareness and prompt more effective government action.
• Develop programming for individuals affected by transnational repression, including social, psychological, legal, and immigration support. Such support should be tailored to the needs of specific diaspora communities, and it should include both harm remediation and tools for pursuing accountability.

Recommendations for UN member states

• Recognize transnational repression as a specific threat to human rights and work with like-minded governments to establish norms and develop multilateral responses.
• Review and revise the protections that are offered to human rights defenders and other activists who engage with the UN to better address the risk of transnational repression. The current safeguards have failed to prevent some governments from excluding, intimidating, or punishing dissidents when they attempt to participate in UN processes.
• Establish a special rapporteur for transnational repression. Existing rapporteurs and working groups lack the mandate required to provide a comprehensive picture of the problem.

Recommendations for technology companies

• Create a company-wide strategy to respond to transnational repression. Raise internal awareness and provide training on the tactics of transnational repression to avoid unwitting complicity. Relevant policy areas may include but are not limited to content moderation, harassment, foreign influence operations, cybersecurity, and privacy. Companies should develop expertise in the languages of targeted communities, work with civil society to identify individuals who may be at risk of online threats or harassment, engage with such individuals or groups to understand their needs, and share best practices with peer companies.
• Adopt secure protocols like end-to-end encryption for company products and expand special protections and safety settings for people who are vulnerable to transnational repression. Companies should proactively notify users who are at risk of or have already suffered from digital attacks and offer resources on how to protect accounts. They should also cooperate with civil society to engage in outreach and draw more people into their digital hygiene programs.
• Strengthen options for documenting transnational repression on digital platforms. It should be recognized that documentation is often burdensome and traumatizing for individuals, but also crucial to civil society research and law enforcement activity. Consider giving people access to tools that allow them to filter, review, report, and document transnational repression in a convenient way. Develop internal means of documenting incidents that can be used to inform company policies. Any form of documentation should prioritize user privacy.
• Publicly identify perpetrators of digital transnational repression and describe the methods and scale of their activity, insofar as such revelations do not expose victims to further harm. Consider standardizing this reporting, for instance by including it in regular reports on transparency, human rights, or foreign influence operations.